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Education Reform and Detroit’s Right 
to Literacy Litigation 
Kristine L. Bowman* 
Abstract 
 
Ongoing education reform litigation arising out of Detroit, 
Michigan presents an innovative claim: Children have an 
unenumerated federal constitutional right of access to literacy. On 
June 29, 2018, the district court granted defendants’ motion to 
dismiss. The case is now on appeal to the Sixth Circuit and is 
expected to be argued in the first half of 2019. This litigation has 
already broken new ground and, regardless of the ultimate 
outcome, it is valuable because it invites us to revisit fundamental 
questions about rights, remedies, and the role of courts in education 
reform.  
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I. Introduction 
In 2016, attorneys representing children in some of Detroit, 
Michigan’s lowest-performing school districts filed a claim in 
federal court alleging the state denied their federal constitutional 
right of access to literacy.1 The conditions in which these children 
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were expected to learn were heartbreaking: The complaint 
described buildings so cold in the winter that students sometimes 
could see their own breath and wore coats to class, and so warm 
during other seasons that students and teachers vomited or 
fainted. The first thing some teachers did when arriving in their 
classrooms in the morning was to sweep up rodent feces because 
buildings were infested with vermin. Students suffered from an 
incredible shortage of books and many of the books that did exist 
were decades old.  In addition to this qualitative description of the 
learning conditions, the complaint also presented quantitative 
disparities: In the five schools the plaintiff children attended, 
students’ literacy proficiency rates were in single digits.2 Clearly, 
something was wrong, but what to do about this was a difficult 
question. 
The innovative claim the plaintiffs’ attorneys advanced in 
response to this situation—that the students’ unenumerated 
federal constitutional right of access to literacy is violated—was 
dismissed by the district court, even though the district court did 
hold that the state was a proper defendant in the suit. The case, 
Gary B. v. Snyder,3 is currently on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. 
Already groundbreaking, it is reminiscent of education rights 
battles that have been fought for decades. Regardless of the 
ultimate outcome of the litigation, we can learn a great deal from 
Gary B. because its arguments invite us to revisit fundamental 
questions about rights, remedies, and the role of courts in 
education reform. 
II. Holding the State Responsible: Rights and Remedies 
As I detailed in The Failure of Education Federalism, 
education advocates in Michigan have been unsuccessful when 
                                                                                                     
Arkansas and I am grateful to colleagues and to students for their input in those 
fora, and to Alexa Shockley and others at Washington and Lee Law Review for 
their thoughtful editing. Additionally, it is appropriate to note that in partnership 
with other scholars, I filed an amicus brief in the Gary B. case in the Eastern 
District of Michigan and also in the Sixth Circuit.  
  1. Class Action Complaint at 1–3, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 2:16-CV-13292 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2016), 2016 WL 4775474. 
  2. Id. at 4–5. 
  3. Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018).   
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pursuing education reform litigation in Michigan state courts, 
despite moderately strong language in Michigan’s constitution 
regarding education.4 Thus, the only remaining judicial avenue for 
addressing for the situation in some of Detroit’s worst public 
schools runs through federal court. This is why Gary B. focuses on 
a small and incredibly important gap in Supreme Court doctrine: 
The question of whether there is a federal constitutional floor 
regarding educational quality.5 Rights and remedies go hand in 
hand,6 and so plaintiffs also contend that the state is an 
appropriate defendant in this case. This section discusses both 
issues, in turn.  
Let us begin with the doctrinal lacuna. When the Supreme 
Court decided San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez7 in 1973, it did not engage the question of whether there 
was a federal right to an education of a certain minimum level of 
quality8—and that is the essence of plaintiffs’ claim in Gary B., 
that there is a substantive floor.9 Specifically, plaintiffs assert that 
the opportunity to become functionally literate is a fundamental, 
unenumerated, federal constitutional right.10 The education 
provided in the schools plaintiffs attend, the Gary B. plaintiffs 
                                                                                                     
 4. Kristi L. Bowman, The Failure of Education Federalism, 51 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 1, 26–30 (2017). 
 5. Gary B., 329 F. Supp. 3d at 363 (“The Court is left to conclude that the 
Supreme Court has neither confirmed nor denied that access to literacy is a 
fundamental right.”). 
 6. Joshua E. Wieshart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. 
REV. 917, 936 (2016). 
 7. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 8. Id. at 35.  
 9. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 77–108. 
 10. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 24–42; see generally Derek W. 
Black, The Fundamental Right to Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (arguing that the Framers would have expected the U.S. 
Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right to education). A similar lawsuit 
was filed in Rhode Island at the very end of November 2018, though its focus is 
squarely on civics education and citizenship. Alia Wong, The Students Suing for 
a Constitutional Right to Education, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/11/lawsuit-constitutional-
right-education/576901/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2018) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); Dana Goldstein, Are Civics Lessons a Constitutional Right? 
This Student Is Suing for Them, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/us/civics-rhode-island-schools.html (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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allege, is of such poor quality that many of the children who attend 
these schools are functionally illiterate, and so as adults they will 
be effectively denied their right to free speech, their right to vote, 
and other enumerated constitutional rights.11 Thus, plaintiffs 
contend, the state has violated students’ rights under the Due 
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. This theory 
builds on the Court’s 1984 decision in Plyler v. Doe,12 in which the 
Court held that the school district could not exclude undocumented 
immigrant students because to do so would deny those children 
“the means and skills” necessary to become productive members of 
society and thus create a “permanent underclass.”13 Constitutional 
harm is often abstract, yet as presented in Gary B., it has a 
heartbreakingly concrete manifestation.  
Two years have passed since plaintiffs filed their complaint in 
fall 2016. During that time, the state’s motion to dismiss was filed, 
briefed, and argued; the district court dismissed the case; and 
plaintiffs appealed. In its decision on the motion to dismiss, the 
district court acknowledged that the fundamental right plaintiffs 
invoked is an open question, and thus the district court engaged in 
an extensive analysis. Specifically, it noted, “a case like this one 
could be argued on either positive- or negative- right theories”14 
and “the allegations state the violation of a negative right.” 
However, the district court found more important that “a violation 
of negative rights is not what the Complaint truly seems to 
argue.”15 Thus, the district court joined other “federal courts [in 
their] . . . reticence to find positive rights to unquestionably 
important necessities of life” and drew from the historical record 
to demonstrate that state-sponsored education was not necessary 
for liberty or justice.16 The district court also found significant that 
the courts which most frequently determine the contours of a right 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 24–42. See also Goodwin 
Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330 (2006) 
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment obligates Congress to ensure a 
meaningful floor of educational opportunities through the guarantee of national 
citizenship and the Equal Protection Clause). 
  12.  457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
  13.    Id. at 221–223. 
 14. Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 364 (E.D. Mich. 2018).   
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. at 365. 
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to education—state courts—do so by looking to state constitutional 
language, not to the fundamental importance of education.17 As a 
result, plaintiffs’ claim for a violation of the Due Process Clause 
failed, and plaintiffs’ claim of an Equal Protection Clause violation 
was not far behind.  
Before reaching the “fundamental right” question, however, 
the district court concluded that the state officials were proper 
defendants.18 In particular, the district court focused on the 
unusual degree of control the state exercised over Detroit’s public 
schools through a series of emergency managers appointed by the 
Governor with input from the state board of education and other 
defendants.19 Furthermore, the district court observed that state 
statutes creating the emergency manager framework initially gave 
each emergency manager broad financial authority over a local 
school district or municipality, and then, as state law changed over 
time, granted emergency managers authority over school districts’ 
academic matters as well.20 The district court also noted that 
various state and federal courts had upheld the emergency 
manager legislation and the acts of individual emergency 
managers. Thus, the district court concluded, the state had 
exercised significant control over Detroit’s public schools through 
emergency management and other similar actions. The district 
court then sought to align the state’s responsibility accordingly, 
concluding that state officials were proper defendants in the case. 
This holding was groundbreaking, even though the district court 
did not go as far as plaintiffs had asked; plaintiffs had tried to hold 
the state responsible for the natural results of the larger system it 
created across the state, rather than hanging their hat on the 
emergency manager legislation—and Detroit—alone.21  
As colleagues and I discussed in an amicus brief submitted to 
the district court in Gary B., the education policies the state of 
Michigan has created over time work together in such a way that 
many of our poorest school districts, like Detroit, are burdened 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 356. 
  18. Id. at 54.  
  19. Id. at 353–54. 
  20. Id. at 350–51. 
  21.  Id. at 352. 
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very heavily.22  Thus, it should not be a surprise that these 
districts provide educational environments and resources so 
inadequate that only a very small percentage of students manage 
to become proficient in reading, much less demonstrate mastery.23   
To explain further: Each state has a web of policies that create 
and shape the system of public education, though of course the 
contours of the web vary from one state to another, sometimes 
significantly.24 The cornerstone of each system is the state finance 
regime.  In Michigan, according to one recent costing-out study, 
schools receive about 75% of the per-pupil allocation necessary to 
provide a basic education.25 According to a subsequent study by 
the same consultants, large school districts like Detroit receive 
about 77% of the necessary base per-pupil allocation.26 So, 
education in that state is under-funded to begin with. Relatedly, 
Michigan’s school finance system is unusually centralized and its 
school choice policies are particularly permissive; as a result, some 
districts’ enrollment fluctuates significantly from one year to the 
next, with wild swings in revenue paired with an inability to cut 
costs to keep up with the decline in revenue.27 Detroit is, 
unfortunately, a poster child in this regard: District enrollment 
shrank by 71% between 2002 and 2016.28 
                                                                                                     
 22. Brief for Michigan Education Law and Policy Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 
16-CV-13292 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017), 2017 WL 2492166. See David Arsen & 
Mary Mason, Which Districts Get into Trouble and Why: Michigan’s Story, 42 J. 
EDUC. FIN. 100 (2016). 
 23. Brief for Michigan Education Law and Policy Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 22.  
 24. Bowman, supra note 4. 
 25.   Id. at 30. 
  26.  AUGENBLICK, PALAICH AND ASSOCIATES & PICUS, ODDEN AND ASSOCIATES, 
COSTING OUT THE RESOURCES NEEDED TO MEET MICHIGAN’S STANDARDS AND 
REQUIREMENTS, viii (2018). 
 27.  Bowman, supra note 4, at 26–29. 
 28.  Lori Higgins, Rapper Big Sean Commits to Helping Detroit Schools’ 
Enrollment Push, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 5, 2018, 11:09 AM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/education/2018/06/05/big-sean-detroit-schools-
enrollment/672350002/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). In fall 2017, the district grew 2% compared to the year 
before. Sam Park & Amanda Rahn, It’s Official: Detroit’s Enrollment Grew For 
the First Time in Over A Decade, Even After Adding the State-Run District, 
CHALKBEAT (Apr. 2, 2018), https://chalkbeat.org/posts/detroit/2018/04/02/its-
official-detroits-enrollment-grew-for-the-first-time-in-over-a-decade-even-after-
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Other aspects of Michigan’s system strain districts’ resources 
even further. Like many other states, Michigan’s teacher pension 
system is severely underfunded, and the state has sought to 
remedy this by increasing school districts’ required pension 
contributions from roughly 13% of employee salaries in 2004 to 
25% as recently as 2012.29 In FY 2019, local districts’ required 
contributions reduced the number of dollars that reached the 
classroom by more than $1300 per student.30 And, Michigan is one 
of fourteen states in which the state does not provide school 
districts any funding for capital improvements,31 so if local 
taxpayers cannot or will not approve a referendum, or if the local 
tax base is so depressed that even a high rate of taxation produces 
relatively little in the way of revenue, a district must 
euphemistically “defer maintenance,” leading to situations such as 
the conditions in Detroit described earlier. The district court 
appeared uninterested in engaging this context, though.  
To be fair, the district court’s approach was not unique. As 
state-level policies like the ones just discussed have been adopted 
and interpreted, they have been viewed in isolation by multiple 
branches of government. Debates about charter schools are seen as 
separate from debates about underfunded pensions, and both are 
seen as unrelated to costs of capital improvements or emergency 
managers. That is a mistake on the part of the legislators and 
governors who have enacted these policies and courts who are 
asked to review them.  
In an amicus brief recently filed in the Sixth Circuit in Gary 
B., colleagues and I reiterated the importance of a systems-
thinking approach.32 We contended that the state of Michigan is a 
proper defendant given the interactions among the generally-
applicable laws and resulting impact on Detroit’s public schools, 
                                                                                                     
adding-the-state-run-district/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. Bowman, supra note 4, at 29–30. 
 30. Governor Snyder’s FY2019 Budget Proposal, CITIZENS RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN, 23 (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://crcmich.org/presentations/2010s/2018/webinar_exec_budget-021518.pdf. 
 31.   Bowman, supra note 4, at 30. 
 32.  Brief for Michigan Education Law and Policy and Civil Rights Professors 
as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Gary B. v. 
Snyder, No. 18-1855/18-1871 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2018).   
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and the extensive control the state has exercised for the past 
twenty years in Detroit.33 Over a dozen other amicus briefs were 
filed in support of plaintiffs-appellants, including those by the 
Detroit Public Schools Community District and the City of Detroit, 
teachers’ unions and other educational advocacy organizations, 
and prominent scholars from education, law, economics, and other 
disciplines.34  
If the Sixth Circuit only upholds the district court’s conclusion 
regarding liability in Detroit based on the emergency managers’ 
authority and similar actions by the state and couples this with a 
recognition of any degree of unconstitutional action, such a holding 
could be helpful to Detroit’s children, but less so to other potential 
plaintiffs because o the high and narrow standard for state 
liability. In mid-2018, Michigan announced that the last school 
district under emergency management had been released from 
that level of oversight.35 It is unlikely that Michigan will see 
emergency managers of school districts in the near future; even 
proponents of the emergency manager idea agree that it has not 
been effective in the educational context. Furthermore, state 
takeover of local school districts similar to what has occurred in 
Michigan is highly unusual in the national context. For these 
reasons, a broader holding could have a much greater impact on 
the widespread illiteracy in Detroit’s public schools and in other 
litigation that seeks to rely on Gary B.  
III. The Role of Courts in Education Reform 
Each time courts define the contours of rights and the scope of 
remedies, they answer specific questions and also participate in a 
larger debate about the proper role of courts in education reform. 
In structural reform litigation where the alleged constitutional 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. 
 34. To read these other briefs, see The Lawsuit, RIGHT TO LITERACY DETROIT, 
https://www.detroit-accesstoliteracy.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 35. Jonathan Oosting, Michigan: No Emergency Managers for First Time 
Since ’00, DETROIT NEWS (June 27, 2018, 3:02 PM), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/06/27/michigan-no-
emergency-managers-first-time-since-2000/737947002/ (last visited Nov. 30, 
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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harm would be a newly-articulated one, as in Gary B., it is 
reasonable to assume that the contours of both the violation and 
the remedy would become more nuanced over time. However, Gary 
B. may not be as much of a unicorn as it first appears. Existing, 
nuanced concepts of federalism as well as prior education reform 
litigation already provide a basis for thinking through the larger 
questions the case presents about the role of courts in education 
reform.  
At the most general level, Gary B. is an intra-state dispute 
that is playing out via basic federalism concepts: Should there be 
a federal floor of educational quality? Don’t—shouldn’t—states 
take care of this?  When framed this way, Gary B. joins many other 
cases that have engaged similar disputes, including two of the 
Court’s most significant school decisions—San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez36 and Milliken v. 
Bradley.37 Interestingly, as Professor Kimberly Jenkin Robinson 
identified, the type of federalism employed in the education 
context—dual federalism—is defined by a strongly state and local 
role and a weak federal one.38 It also is outdated. In other highly-
regulated areas of social policy, including environment and health, 
the concept of cooperative federalism is dominant.39 Cooperative 
federalism is based on creating a partnership between state and 
federal governments to solve problems where the governments’ 
interests are aligned. It also is premised on limited federal 
involvement, though more than is customary under dual 
federalism.40 Thus, cooperative federalism could conceptually 
ground, and, importantly, still limit a federal right of access to 
literacy. If framed in this way, the right would take the form of a 
floor (and a low one at that) which in many states might not add 
any substantive rights beyond those recognized in an individual 
state’s school finance litigation. It also would position federal 
courts as an option of last resort. In states like Michigan and 
                                                                                                     
 36. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 37. 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Rick Su, Intrastate Federalism, 19 J. CONST. L. 191, 
241–43 (2016). 
 38. Bowman, supra note 4, at 5. 
 39. .Id. at 6–7. See also Su, supra note 37, at 221–26; Kimberly Jenkins 
Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 959 (2015); 
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 287, 292 (2013). 
  40. Bowman, supra note 4, at 6. 
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districts like Detroit, however, a right configured in this manner 
could do a lot to improve the educational opportunities available to 
students. 
A right of access to literacy framed as part of cooperative 
federalism also would be consistent with federal courts’ limited 
appetite for overseeing education reform litigation. Consider the 
arc of school desegregation, the most significant systemic 
education reform litigation effort federal courts have seen.  Prior 
to Brown v. Board of Education41 in 1954, state and local laws 
prohibited children of different races from attending school 
together because of the color of their skin.42 Although the Brown 
court struck down segregational laws as unconstitutional, little 
changed in most schools for at least a decade; even though schools 
were no longer segregated by law, social resistance had entrenched 
those practices.43 When it became apparent that educational 
access had not changed much at all in reality, the Court eventually 
expanded the constitutional harm by defining unconstitutional 
segregation as de jure segregation—intentional practices that 
entrenched a system of segregation and unequal opportunities, 
whether or not they took the form of statutes.44 In the context of 
school desegregation remedies, “the elimination of segregation 
‘root and branch’”45 was a strong mandate, yet after decades of 
extensive and expensive court-ordered remedies failed to close 
achievement gaps, the Court seemed to lose its appetite for 
pursuing racial and ethnic equality in education. Ultimately, the 
Court defined unitary status in such a way that made it easier and 
easier for school districts to wind up school desegregation’s 
remedial phase even as disparities persisted.46 This is not 
unrelated to the fact that a majority of the Court never wanted to 
touch the connection between housing segregation and school 
                                                                                                     
 41. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 42. Id. at 487–88.  
 43. Gary Orfield, Education and Civil Rights: Lessons of Six Decades and 
Challenges of a Changed Society, in THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALITY 
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: MENDEZ, BROWN, AND BEYOND 405–30 (Kristi L. 
Bowman ed., 2014). 
 44.    Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 (1973). 
 45. Id. at 222 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 46. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
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segregation47 or to define harm as based on students’ lived 
experience in the absence of school districts’ intent.48   
Taken together, the Court’s school desegregation decisions 
first expanded and then contracted the role of federal courts in 
education reform, but they have never eliminated it entirely. “But 
those were Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination cases, and 
that’s not what we have here,” a clever reader is thinking. That 
may or may not be the case; plaintiffs present an Equal Protection 
Clause argument that Detroit students are denied access to 
literacy as compared to other students across Michigan, and the 
amicus brief by Harvard law professor Martha Minor explains why 
Brown v. Board of Education49 is the conceptual grandparent of 
Gary B.50 Regardless, if we agree with plaintiffs’ claim that a right 
of access to literacy is a necessary prerequisite for individuals to 
realize explicit fundamental rights, then access to literacy is also 
fundamental, and thus a proper subject of federal courts’ 
attention—though not necessarily a subject of unlimited attention. 
One last concept related to the role of courts in education 
reform is thornier, though it is not one related to federalism. In a 
nutshell, systemic reforms have the advantage of achieving broad 
change, yet they also, by their definition, subordinate the interests 
of any one individual to those of the group and thus can lead to 
individual inequities even within an equitable system. In school 
desegregation litigation, for example, courts overseeing remedies 
regularly allow 15% leeway on either side of an enrollment 
demographic target when asking whether individual schools in a 
district reflect the population of the school district as a whole.51  
                                                                                                     
 47. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974); see generally RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT 
SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (detailing how state action at the local, state, and 
federal level created and perpetuated segregated neighborhoods). 
 48. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208–09; Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214–17 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218–35 (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 49. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 50. Brief for Martha Minow as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 18-1855/18-1871 (6th Cir. Nov. 26, 2018).   
 51. See, e.g., Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 377–
78 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing the “plus 15 percent” average); Stell v. Bd. of Pub. 
Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1583–84 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (discussing the 15 percent 
variance permitted by other courts). 
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Although this flexibility may seem limited, it can lead to 
significant variation among schools.52 Student discipline and other 
policies also can produce racially/ethnically disproportionate 
results that turn out to be constitutionally permissible even while 
a district is under court supervision.  Similarly, the focus in school 
finance litigation is not on whether individual students actually 
are provided a constitutionally adequate education; rather, it is on 
creating and funding a state system that should be able to produce 
certain opportunities for all students. This is something advocates 
must accept if they pursue a systemic remedy, particularly one tied 
to a right focused on access, not outcomes. Judicial involvement in 
systemic reform is not, and never will be, a panacea. 
Issues of educational (in)equality and (in)equity are difficult 
and complex.  In our country, state legislatures have primary 
responsibility for maintaining a system of laws that both support 
and constrain our school districts, and even with slightly greater 
federal involvement, this can continue to be the case. Courts 
operate as a check on school districts and state legislatures, and in 
my view going to court, especially to federal court, in an effort to 
achieve education reform should be a last resort.  In Michigan, 
however, state courts are not determining the contours of a 
violation or remedy—they have insisted that it is not their role to 
do so, and they do not conceptualize the problem as a one of a 
broken system, much less a broken system the state has 
responsibility to fix.53 Although the federal district court in Gary 
B. took a different view when concluding that the state was a 
proper defendant, its rationale was exceedingly narrow and it 
rejected the right on which plaintiffs based their claim. Thus, the 
district court repeated some mistakes of the past. Within a 
framework of cooperative federalism, the Sixth Circuit has an 
opportunity to do otherwise.  
                                                                                                     
 52. If a court divides students into two groups for demographic purposes 
(i.e. white and non-white), and the district is multi-racial/ethnic, it can lead to 
schools that do not remotely reflect the demographics of a district. 
  53. Bowman, supra note 4, 16–25. 
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IV. Conclusion 
The conceptual and practical challenges to a right of access to 
literacy may seem overwhelming, and understandably this is part 
of why some people, including some judges, think courts do not 
belong in the business of systemic education reform. In my view, 
the legislative and executive branch are the best places to create 
and refine education policy that serves all of our children in a way 
that respects each one’s potential. However, when the result of 
state legislative, executive, and judicial action is a system in which 
the only option for many families is a school with single-digit 
literacy proficiency and appalling physical conditions, a dispute 
about jurisdiction seems academic in the worst possible way.  
The Supreme Court has hinted that there might be a federal 
constitutional floor, albeit a low one, that guarantees a minimum 
quality of education. The district court in Gary B. was not 
unsympathetic to the reasons why; in its words, “[t]he conditions 
and outcomes of Plaintiffs’ schools, as alleged, are nothing short of 
devastating. When a child who could be taught to read goes 
untaught, the child suffers a lasting injury—and so does society.”54 
The Sixth Circuit should take up the challenge to navigate the 
uncharted territory presented by Gary B., consistent with the 
principles of cooperative federalism.  In a country that is a global 
leader in the twenty-first century, it should not be too much to 
expect that our public schools provide all of our children an 
opportunity to become functionally literate, and thus exercise the 
fundamental rights of citizenship and realize the promise of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
                                                                                                     
 54. Gary B. v. Snyder, 329 F. Supp. 3d 344, 366 (E.D. Mich. 2018). 
